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RECENT UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS REAFFIRM THE PRINCIPLE THAT 
AN INSURED IS ENTITLED TO THE BROADEST POSSIBLE PROTECTION THAT 
HE COULD REASONABLY HAVE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE POLICY. 
In its responsive brief, Northwestern National 
Insurance Company suggests that the Court should take a 
restrictive view of its insurance policy and interpret the 
language in a manner which avoids coverage. The insurer seeks to 
find technical reasons to deny coverage and ignore reasonable 
interpretations of its policy language to the detriment of its 
insured. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed and 
clarified the rule that an insurance policy is to be interpreted 
in favor of coverage in the case of USF&G v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 
(Utah 1993). In the Sandt case, the Utah Supreme Court 
invalidated an insurer7s attempt to limit UIM recovery for its 
insured finding that the policy at issue was ambiguous and must 
be construed in favor of the insured. In expanding on the rules 
for interpreting insurance policies, the Court quoted earlier 
Utah case law with emphasis as follows: 
. . . The rule of strictissimi juris has been 
applied almost universally to insurance 
contracts, and this jurisdiction, like many 
others, has declared in favor of a liberal 
construction in favor of the insured to 
accomplish the purpose for which the 
insurance was taken out and for which the 
premium was paid. 
854 P.2d at 522. 
The Court went on to point out that "an insured is 
entitled to the broadest coverage he could reasonably understand 
from the policy" and that "insurance terms should be understood 
in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense." 854 P.2d at p. 
523. 
The Court set out the test for ambiguity in a policy as 
follows: 
An ambiguity in a contract may arise (1) 
because of vague or ambiguous language in a 
particular provision or (2) because two or 
more contract provisions, when read together, 
give rise to different or inconsistent 
meanings even though each provision is clear 
when read alone. 
854 P.2d at 523. 
In the instant case, as in the Sandt case, ambiguity 
arises in the policy when the usual and customary meanings of the 
words of the policy are used and as a result of inconsistencies 
between provisions from different sections of the insurance 
contract. The policy must be interpreted liberally to the 
benefit of the insured. 
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POINT II 
COVERAGE FOR PRIME'S LOSSES IS FOUND UNDER EITHER THE DEFINITION 
OF "MONEY" OR THE DEFINITION OF "SECURITIES" OF 
THE POLICY OR UNDER BOTH PROVISIONS. 
A. Prime's Losses Resulted "Directly" from the Actions of Its 
Dishonest Employee. 
The insureds brief attempts to characterize the losses 
suffered by Prime as "indirect" losses. The insurer claims that, 
therefore, the losses are not subject to coverage notwithstanding 
the fact that they resulted in a loss of money. The insurer's 
creative argument cannot stand up to the rule of law that an 
insurance policy must be interpreted in favor of the insured if 
any reasonable interpretation of its language could provide for 
coverage. 
The insurer directs the Court's attention to Section A-
3 of the Crime General Provisions form. This section deals with 
indirect losses. However, it does not define what a direct loss 
is as opposed to an indirect loss. The section simply states: 
Indirect loss: Loss that is an indirect 
result of any act or occurrence covered by 
this insurance including, but not limited to, 
loss resulting from: 
a. Your inability to realize income that you 
would have realized had there been no loss of 
or property damage to covered property. 
b. Payment of damages of any type for which 
you are legally liable. But, we will pay 
compensatory damages arising directly from a 
loss covered under this insurance. 
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c. Payment of costs, fees, or other expenses 
you incur in establishing either the 
existence or the amount of loss under this 
insurance. 
The insurer points to Subsection b in claiming that the 
loss in this case is indirect. Subsection b is self-
contradictory. The first sentence states that it will not cover 
payment of damages. The second sentence says that it will cover 
payment of "compensatory" damages. At best, the subsection gives 
no definition of the words "direct" and "indirect." At worst, it 
is self-contradictory and a nullity. 
In this case, it is agreed that the damages occurred as 
a consequence of Prime's employee's dissemination of secret 
access codes and business information regarding Prime. The 
employee's purpose of obtaining free long distance telephone 
service for her husband and cohorts is readily apparent and 
implicit from her actions. A reasonable policy holder could 
certainly believe that such losses were a "direct" result of the 
employee's act. 
The insurer's argument that because the secret 
information was passed to a third party, the loss is indirect, is 
illogical and certainly not what an ordinary individual would 
understand from the insurance policy. The loss in this case is 
no different than if the dishonest employee had given a 
combination to the company's safe to a third party who then used 
that information to steal money or securities. There is nothing 
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in the insurance policy to suggest that the passing of secret 
information which leads to losses of money and securities is not 
a direct loss. 
B. The Insurer's Attempts to Distinguish Case Law are 
Unavailing. 
The insurer's Brief attempts to distinguish the cases 
cited by Prime which interpret similar policy language and 
provide for coverage. The insurer has been unable to cite any 
similar case where coverage was denied by the court. All similar 
cases cited uphold coverage. 
The only case cited by the insurer which supports its 
restrictive interpretation of the "money" definition of the 
policy goes on to find coverage under the "securities" definition 
of the policy. Portland Federal Employees Credit Union v. Cumis 
Insurance, 894 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1990). The insurer attempts 
to distinguish the Portland case by speculating that "the 
coverage clause was probably inherently different." (Insurer's 
Brief, p. 22.) The insurer further attempts to distinguish the 
case by reverting to its claim of direct versus indirect loss and 
then suggests that checks which were found to be "securities" in 
the Portland case would not be found to be "securities" under the 
policy at issue. The insurer's analysis is self-contradictory. 
The Portland case stands for the proposition that checks for the 
payment of money are "securities" and consequently are included 
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in the property covered under both the Portland case and in the 
instant case. 
The insurer's attempts to distinguish the other cases 
cited for their interpretation of the definition of "money" are 
similarly flawed. The insurer argues that the definition of 
"money" should be restricted to only physical cash. The policy 
contains no such specific statement. Each of the cases cited by 
Prime in its initial brief involve circumstances in which the 
"money" taken was not in physical form or physically taken from 
the insured. See Northwest Airlines v. Globe Indemnity Co., 225 
N.W.2d 831 (Minn. 1975), where the "money" loss was a reduction 
in a bank account balance; Southside Motor Co. v. Transamerica 
Insurance, 350 S.2d 470 (Fla. App. 1980), where the "money" loss 
was an amount paid to settle a third party claim; Empire of 
Carolina v. Continental Casualty Company, 414 S.E.2d 389 (N.C. 
App. 1992), where the "money" loss was a kickback scheme of 
credits and improper payments; Northbrook National Insurance v. 
Nehoc Advertising Service, Inc., 554 N.E.2d 251 (Illinois App. 
1989), where the "money" loss was an amount paid to settle a 
third party claim. 
Each of the above-referenced cases involve an 
interpretation of the definition of "money" in an insurance 
policy. Most involve definitions very similar to that in the 
instant case. In each case, the courts applied a standard of 
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interpreting the policy language to the benefit of the insured 
and found coverage. 
The insurer has not questioned Prime's argument that 
the word "money" is one of common usage which normally would 
include the type of losses involved in this case. As a 
consequence, in the event the insurer wished to restrict its 
policy to something substantially different than the common man 
would understand from the simple word "money", it is necessary 
that that coverage restriction be absolutely clear and 
unmistakable. In this case, as in the above cited cases, that 
restriction is simply not sufficiently clear. An ordinary 
person, reading the insurance policy in its entirety, could 
certainly understand that coverage for "money" would include the 
kind of out-of-pocket losses involved in this case even though 
physical cash was not carried out of Prime's offices. 
The insurer's attempt to restrict coverage to physical 
cash runs directly counter to the fundamental purpose of Prime 
and its agent in purchasing employee dishonesty coverage. As the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated, the policy should be interpreted 
"in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of words, and 
in the light of existing circumstances including the purpose of 
the policy. Nielsen v. O'Riley, 848 P.2d 644 (Utah 1992) at p. 
666. Emphasis added. The insurer's brief asks the Court to 
ignore these basic principles of policy construction. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the insurer has suggested several new sections 
of its policy, the fundamental problem remains. A reasonable 
person standing in the shoes of Prime could certainly have 
understood that its out-of-pocket losses due to the dishonesty of 
its employee would be covered. Contrary to the insurer's 
argument, the insurance policy does not specifically restrict 
losses of "money" and "securities" to physical cash. 
This Court should issue its opinion determining that 
the policy in question covered Prime's out-of-pocket losses that 
resulted as a consequence of Michelle Davis's distribution of 
Prime's secret information to her cohorts. The case should be 
remanded to the trial court for a determination of the dollar 
amount of those out-of-pocket losses. \ 
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